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INTRODUCTION
By Order dated May 1, 1990, the Supreme Court
authorized this Supplementary Brief to address specific issues
which relate to the mechanics of the guilty plea on February 1,
1984.

Mr. Earle's knowing and voluntary entry of a guilty plea

is analyzed in Point III (pages 33-38) of petitioner's
original brief.

This supplementary brief augments and

highlights that prior discussion.
On May 1st, the Court authorized supplementary
briefing on three issues.

However, this supplementary brief

addresses only two of those issues.

After further analysis, it

has been determined that no reversible error occurred with
regard to whether the plea was properly tendered by the
prosecution or whether the plea was made without undue
influence or involvement of the trial court.
With regard to the other two issues, reversible error
definitely occurred in the process of taking the guilty pleas.
As demonstrated in Point I below, the Defendant's Affidavit was
woefully inadequate in listing the elements of the charged
crimes, and the trial court's examination of Mr. Earle on this
important plea element was superficial at best.

In Point II,

below, it is shown that the description of Mr. Earle's conduct
in the Defendant's Affidavit was not only factually inaccurate,

but also legally inadequate.

The trial court made no follow-up

inquiry on this required plea element.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT DID NOT FULLY
OR ACCURATELY ADDRESS THE ELEMENTS OF THE
CHARGED CRIMES TO WHICH HE PLEAD GUILTY
One of the requirements at the time Mr. Earle entered
his guilty plea was that a defendant must understand the
nature and elements of the offense to which he is pleading
guilty.

U.C.A. § 77-35-ll(e)(4) (Supp. 1980).

This

requirement flows from federal constitutional standards that a
plea cannot be knowing and voluntary unless a defendant
understands the law in relation to the facts. McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987),
aff'd., 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989), this court outlined the
statutory requirements of a proper plea under U.C.A.
§ 77-35-11. A plea cannot be considered voluntary unless a
defendant receives notice of the nature of the charges against
him, and the court affirmatively determines that the conduct
which defendant admits actually satisfies the elements of the
crimes charged.

In the process of taking a proper guilty plea,

written affidavits may be used, but the court must still
determine affirmatively and on the record that the defendant
-2-

understands the charges and admits to the requisite conduct to
satisfy those charges.

State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92

(Utah Ct.App. 1988)# cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (1988).

The

court cannot rely upon defendant's attorney in ascertaining
these two critical elements of a proper plea.

Id.

The court in Gibbons requires strict compliance
with the plea requirements.

However, in State v.

Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App. 1988), the court
held that pleas entered prior to Gibbons need only show by
the "record as a whole" that a defendant knew and understood
the crime and elements charged as well as the consequences of
his plea in order for the plea to be considered voluntary.
This is absolutely essential for a plea which meets
constitutional and statutory muster.

State v. Copeland, 765

P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) (elements of crime not listed in
affidavit or on the record); State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d
92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (defendant claimed that the court
failed to find he understood the nature and elements of the
offenses charged and failed to determine if he understood the
possibility of consecutive sentences); Jolivet v. Cook, 784
P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) (defendant claimed the court failed to
determine he understood the nature and elements of the offenses
charged and failed to determine if he understood the
possibility of consecutive sentences).
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Even under the pre-Gibbons standard of substantial
compliance, neither the Defendant's Affidavit, nor the trial
court satisfied the requirement of proper description of the
elements of the crime.

A copy of the Affidavit appears as

pages 031-032 in the record of both of the district court cases
(CR83-1541 and CR83-1542).

Copies of those pages of the record

are included at Appendix "A" to this brief.

An examination

shows that there was only one Affidavit prepared to cover both
cases.

The only difference between the two records is the

circling of one of the two case numbers at the top right-hand
corner of the Affidavit.
Before addressing the defects in listing of the
elements of the crime, it is worth emphasizing that because
only one Affidavit was filled out for both pleas, and because
the Affidavit indicates that the punishment may only be "1-15
years," Mr. Earle was justifiably astonished when he was
eventually sentenced to consecutive terms of one-fifteen
years.

See pp. 35-36, Point III, of petitioner's original

brief.

Failure to clearly inform the defendant of the maximum

possible sentences is reversible error.
Vasilacopulos, supra.

State v.

This failure is patent on the face

of Defendant's Affidavit.
Now, with regard to the elements of the crimes,
aggravated exploitation of prostitution is described on the
Affidavit as follows:
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1) Any person who expl.
2) Anyone for purpus (sic) of
3) prostitution = Agg Exp of Prostitution
The actual statutory elements of this crime were found at the
time of the plea in U.C.A. § 76-10-1306

(Supp. 1973).

(1) A person is guilty of aggravated
exploitation if:
(a) In committing an act of exploiting
prostitution, as defined in
§ 76-10-1305, he uses any force,
threat, or fear against any person; or
(b) The person procured, transported,
orpersuaded or with whom he shares the
proceeds of prostitution is under 18
years of age or is the wife of the
actor.
And exploiting prostitution is defined as
§ 76-10-1305

follows under U.C.A.

(Supp. 1973):
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting
prostitution if he:
(a) Procures an inmate for a house
of prostitution or place in a house
of prostitution for one who would
be an inmate; or
(b) Encourages, induces or
otherwise purposely causes another
to become or remain a prostitute;
or
(c) Transports a person into or
within this state with the purpose
to promote that person's engaging
in prostitution or procuring or
paying for transportation with that
purpose; or

-5-

(d) Not being a child or legal
dependent of a prostitute, shares
the proceeds of prostitution with
the prostitute pursuant to their
understanding that he is to share
therein.
(e) Owns, controls, manages,
supervises or otherwise keeps,
alone or in association with
another, a house of prostitution or
a prostitution business.
In contrast with this explicit statutory definition,
the Defendant's Affidavit is grossly inadequate.
lists none of the specific elements.

The Affidavit

In essence, it is merely

a conclusion of the crime using the title to define the crime
itself.

The Affidavit's definition wouldn't satisfy a 7th

grade vocabulary exam, and it certainly doesn't fulfill the
Constitutional and statutory requirements of due process.
The Defendant's Affidavit is similarly inadequate in
its definition of attempted aggravated kidnapping.

The

language is as follows:
1) Any person
2) who attempts
3) to hold anyone
4) without consent = att. agg kid.
The statutory requirements for this charge are also a
combination of two separate criminal statutes.

Aggregated

kidnapping is defined in U.C.A. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 1983), and
the crime of attempt is found at U.C.A. § 76-4-101 (Supp.
1973) .

The aggregated kidnapping statute reads as follows:
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(1) A person commits aggravated kidnapping
if the person intentionally or knowingly,
without authority of law and against the
will of the victim, by any means and in any
manner, seizes, confines, details, or
transports the victim with intent:
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or
as a shield for hostage, or to compel
a third person to engage in particular
conduct or to forebear from engaging
in particular conduct; on
(b) To facilitate the commission,
attempted commission, or flight after
commission or attempted commission of
a felony; or
(c) To inflict bodily injury or or to
terrorize the victim or another; or
(d) To interfere with the performance
of any governmental or political
function.
(e) To commit a sexual offense as
described in part 4 of this chapter.
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be
the result of force, threat, or deceit if
the victim is mentally incompetent or
younger than sixteen years and the
detention or moving is accomplished without;
the effective consent of the victim's
custodial parent, guardian, or person
acting in loco parentis to the victim.
The crime of attempt is defined as:
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the commission of
the offense, he engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step towards
commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does
not constitute a substantial step unless it
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is strongly corroborative of the actor's
intent to commit the offense*
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt
shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was
actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal
impossibility, if the defense could
have been committed had the attendant
circumstances been as the actor
believed them to be.
Here again, the description of attempted aggravated
kidnapping in the Defendant's Affidavit is totally deficient.
The specific elements of aggravated kidnapping and attempt are
not listed.

The mens rea elements of aggravated kidnapping

and attempt are not mentioned.

The definition is merely a

conclusion which uses the name of the crime (complete with
informally abbreviated terms) to define the crime itself.
The transcript of the plea hearing on February 1,
1984, demonstrates that the trial court did not insure that
Mr. Earle understood the elements of the crimes charged.
(See transcript at Appendix "B.")

At the hearing,

Mr. Earle's counsel presented the Defendant's Affidavit to the
trial court and represented as follows:
We have, we being myself and Mr. Earle
have, prepared an affidavit, and have gone
over that affidavit. Mr. Earle understands
his constitutional rights, understands the
maximum possible penalties of the two
charges and is prepared at this particular
time to sign the affidavit in open court.
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Appendix "B" at p. 3.
No mention is made here of the elements of the
crimes.

The trial court did not follow up to insure that the

elements were accurately stated and fully understood by the
defendant.

The closest the trial court came to addressing the

elements of the crimes was in the following exchange:
THE COURT: Have you gone over an affidavit
with your attorney?
MR. EARLE:

Yes, your Honor, I have.

THE COURT: And do you understand the
contents of that document?
MR. EARLE:

Yes, your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: Do you understand if you sign
that you will be pleading guilty as I have
stated to you?
MR. EARLE:

Yes, your Honor, I do.

The procedure followed by the trial court will not
do.

In State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), this

Court discussed the importance of the defendant's understanding
of the nature and elements of the crimes to which he pleads
guilty.

Breckenridge involved arson.

At the time of the

plea, the court explained the elements of arson, including

the

unlawful and intentional damage to property by means of fire.
The defendant said he understood these element.

The trial

court then asked the defendant to explain what happened at the
time of the fire.

The defendant admitted setting fire to some

garbage at the back of the property where he worked, but that
-9-

the fire got out of control and defeated the defendants
attempts to put it out.

Defendant then plead guilty, and he

was convicted and sentenced by the trial court on the basis of
that plea.
On appeal, this Court recognized that the defendant's
explanation of the fire was totally at odds with his statement
that he understood the elements of arson which included
intentional damage to property by means of fire.

The Court

said:
The [trial] court has an undoubted duty to
guard against the possibility that an
accused who is innocent of the crime
charged may be induced to plead guilty
without sufficient understanding of the
nature of the charge or the consequences of
his plea.
688 P.2d at 443.

The defendants plea in Breckenridge was

properly set aside and his conviction was vacated.
The same result should obtain in this case.
Mr. Earle was less informed of the elements of the charged
crimes than the defendant in Breckenridge.

The Defendant's

Affidavit contributes nothing to an intelligent understanding
of the elements of the crime.

Neither the comments of defense

counsel nor the inquiry of the trial court on February 1, 1984,
were adequate to meet the standard which would allow a knowing
entry of guilty plea.

Mr. Earle's guilty plea should be set

aside, and his conviction should be vacated.
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POINT II
THE DESCRIPTION OF CONDUCT IN THE
DEFENDANTS AFFIDAVIT WAS INADEQUATE
TO ESTABLISH COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES
AND KNOWING ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA TO THOSE CRIMES
The requirement that the defendant's admitted conduct
satisfy the elements of the charged crimes really grows out of
and is a dependent upon the standard for full and proper
description of the crimes.

The Defendant's Affidavit fails by

a mile to hit this critical element.

The Affidavit (see

Appendix "A") simply states as follows:
I, Robert Bradbury, AKA Anthony Earle,
aided and abetted others in the acts
described.
In fact, no "acts" are described in the Affidavit.

If "acts"

refers to the elements of the crimes which are listed on the
Affidavit, then the deficient description of defendant's
conduct fails doubly by reliance upon a deficient definition of
the crimes.

(See Point I, supra.)

Even if the Affidavit adequately and accurately
described Mr. Earle's conduct, the Affidavit itself cannot
serve as a substitute for full and complete examination on the
record by the trial court in order to establish a knowing and
voluntary entry into the plea.
1332 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).

State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d

It is the trial court's burden to

insure both that the crimes are adequately described and that

-11-

the conduct to which the defendant pleads satisfies the
elements of those crimes.
Vasicopulos, supra.

State v. Gibbons, State v.

At the hearing on February 1, 1984,

neither defense counsel nor the trial court made even a pretext
of an effort to confirm that Mr. Earle's actual conduct
satisfied the crimes with which he was charged.

(See record

of hearing at Appendix "B.")
It is also unclear in the Affidavit as to what is
meant by "aiding and abetting."

That crime was defined at the

time of Mr. Earle's guilty plea as follows:
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense
who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages,
or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense, shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct.
U.C.A. § 76-2-202 (Supp. 1973).

It is inconceivable,

especially in a case such as Mr. Earle's where he had at least
two other co-defendants who were indicted and arraigned on the
same charges, that the conduct element of the plea could be
satisfied by the label of "aiding and abetting" without some
inquiry as to Mr. Earle's interaction with other perpetrators
of the crime.

The cursory label which the Defendant's

Affidavit gives to Mr. Earle's conduct, and the complete
absence of any discussion of conduct on the record,
demonstrates a wholesale failure to satisfy this required
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element of a proper guilty plea.

Mr, Earle's plea should be

set aside and his conviction vacated,
CONCLUSION
The fundamental objective of the constitutional and
statutory guidelines for a proper plea has to be that no
unwitting defendants are convicted of crimes which they did not
actually commit.

This goal cannot be achieved unless the

guilty plea is knowing and voluntary.

The plea cannot be

knowing unless the defendant understands the specific elements
of the crime.

The plea cannot be voluntary unless the

defendant's conduct actually satisfies the elements of the
charged crime.
Were this not the case, a guilty plea would be, in
essence, merely a confession.

In order to be legitimate, the

law must be concerned with objective standards of truth. A
defendant's "confession" in the face of the intimidating,
confusing, and powerful presence of society's police force will
not preserve the moral imperative which is the foundation of
all legitimate government.

Society can only preserve its

legitimacy by self-restrained application of its laws. Holding
itself to the articulated, objective standards of valid
criminal pleas is a fundamental aspect of society's proper
self-restraint.
Mr. Earle's "confession" cannot absolve the
prosecutor, the trial court, and indeed, defense counsel, from
-13-

their collective duty to insure that true justice is done. An
arrangement of convenience which is premised upon well meaning
calculations of legal risk will not suffice.

Mr. Earle's

incarceration under these circumstances is not legitimate, and
this Court should act immediately to rectify the continuing
injustice.
DATED this

f^

day of May, 1990.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

IT7TER16KS,
:torneys for Anthony Earle
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the f4 daY o f Aty . 1990,
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
foregoing tto
o BHe
e mailed
first-class, postage prepaid to the following:
Barbara Bearnson
Attorney General•s Office
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

EARLE1.1/RCF
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APPENDIX "A"

T$*g&»**i

, under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea ol
guilty to rhe c h a r t s / of:

Facts:

elements:

^

T

!f^

Jjf4iffAdA&~

4t4-

i

Attf////<"/
dJ8%t*A.£^*
A&4&44*di?d '

i*r

I have received a copy of the cha ze (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guiltv to is a
(Degree ot Felony fir i lass tf M
Misdemeanor)
3nd understand ;he punishment tor this cr.me may be
oi »>on term. .

fine/or borh. I am no

My pita of guilts is freely and voluntarily made I am represented by Attnrncy

f^fUx O €

who ru* explained my rights to me and ! understand them.
1 I know tnat I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I
hav< entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire.
2 1 know tnat if I wish to r .e a trial. 1 have a right to see and hear the witnesses against mc in open court in m\
prr nee and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my atton v. I also
know that i have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my rvnalt and
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so. the jury will be told that this mav not »<e held
against me
3 ! know tnat if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged
be\ond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that ot guilty or not guilty must be by a
complete agreement of all jurors.
4 i know ihat under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this me.nisthtV
1 ca mot be compelled to admit that 1 have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unit* ! ?h »:• v.
to do so.
5 I know that under the constitution of Utah that it 1 were tried and convi ed by a jur\ or by the M»!/" 'hat I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme court of Utah for review o* ine trip1
proceedings and that if I cocld not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid hv th
State without cost to me.
6 I know anu understand that by entering a plea of guilty 1 am giving up m\ constitutional rights as set out in the
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty ot the crime to which my pica ot guiltv ;s entered.
? I also know mat if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense ol which I have Serf.
cf '.victed or to which I have nlead guilty, my plea in the present action . ay r - ult in consecutive sentences heir P
imposed o r ,»e.
. -, ,<~, ,

8 1 know that the fact that 1 have entered a pleaofguii > does not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine
or sentence ot imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will
be.
9 No promise* or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)):
.

#

-/*$-&

~

will ne'iismibseu. ar.d that no other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which
are now know.i to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, deluding a reduction of the charges for sentencing made
or sought by either defense counsel or coun , el for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by
the Judge.
10. 1 have reaJ this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents. I
am —j&mL— vcars of age, have attended school through the
understand the Knglish language.
'/•ted this

ft

/&

£Tmf\*4

an(j

\ can

reac j anc j

,av of

Subscribed anu uorn to before me in Court this

< FRIIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTO
I certifv that ! am the attorney for KiTlLLA^C **^*UAAAAJ*y~>
, the detendant named above and I know »,
lead the Affidavit, or that 1 have read it to him, and I discu^afed it with him and believe he fully understands the
,.,-aning of its content and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my know ieuge and belief the statements.
representations and declarations made by the d#fe«dant in the foreatftTta Affidavit are in all respect* accurate \nd true

fenxnp
se Attornev
< FRTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:

&LL

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against
. detendant
nave reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accuse, No improper
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable ciuse to
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of .he pka
would serve the public interest.

L£LA**^3L23e-siJcZu^/
Prosecuting Attornev
ORDER
Rased upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds :he defendant'* plea c,\
cuiltv is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set fort!, m the
Affidavit be accepted and entered.
^^
.
r*
Done in Court this

-/-

dav of

^

^

. _ . I 9 1_T

District Judee

OOC J 2

1 HE STATE"
Plamtilf

vit of Defendant
H

£

Criminal No

^3,"""

/^

'>

. under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea ol

euiitv to the chargeis) of

s»-,/<-W-' &£.%$.rijfa&SXJi^

ffl.d^-lQlhfi*fu**t

Facts

Elements

•;*?/ /l^Ly ;&4^o ^ ?

J

AjLluA

-^g/-

Vs/74s*y

4 fy&ff AdU^

^cy
•^

4t4~

^

rf0*fiU>U>

Oj^JM^JLeA-L

w?/

1 have received a cop\ ol the chaTgc (Intormation) and understand the crime I am pleading guiltv to is a

:

/^Y^r-

—

(Degree ^i Felony ^Jr C lass o\ Misdemeanor)
ind understand (he pum.shment !or this crime may be
. p. ixon term.
tyfoP'"*

linef or both I am not/on (drugs t.i u w onol

Mv plea o! guilt\ is trcciy and voluntarily made I am rcp'cscntcd by Attorney

r^CXji o e

r*n,

\wno has explained mv rights to me and I understand them
1 1 know that 1 have a constitutional neht to plead not guiltv and to have a iury trial upon the charge :<> -A Inch I
have entered a plea ot guiltv. or to a trial by a |udge should I desire
2 1 know that il" 1 wish to h . a ' a trial 1 have a right to sec and hear the witnesses against me in open . >ur\ :n mv
p t o o nee and bet ore the Judge and iur\ A uh the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my aiiornev I also
know that 1 have a right to have mv witnesses subpoenaed at btate expense to testily in court upon mv V-hail and
that I could testify on my own behalt. and that il 1 choose not to do so. thejury will be told that this ma\ not he held
against me
) 1 know that if I were to have a trial thai the prosecutor must prove each and every clement of the c;,ci, i barged
he\ ond a reasonable doubt, that anv verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that ol guiltv or not guilt;. .; i^t be by a
complete agreement of all jurors
4 1 know that under the constitution that I haven right not to give evidence against mvself and that this Means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I J.'.oose
10 dO s o

5 ! know that under the constitution of Utah that it I were tried and convicted by a jur\ or bv the J KJLI'J that 1
would have a right to appeal mv conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah tor review oj n c trial
proceedings ind that if I could not atford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by ;hc
State without cost to me
6 I know and understand that bv cnteung a pica ol guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as >et o :: n ;hc
preceedma paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty ol the crime to which my pica ol guile > enured
I also k now that it 1 am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another olfense ol whici I \ i . e been
convicted or to which 1 have plead guiltv my plea in the present action may result inconsecutive ^cir.cii'.c. being
imposed on ,»e

<iir~;..ini

or sentence 01 imprisonment upon me anu nu pi umiicb nave occn maacio mc oy anyone as :o wnat ir.e seme nee w wi
be.
9 No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges
pending against mc, to-wii: (Court case number(s) or count(s)):

"

it-us**

will be dismissed, and that no other Charcots) will be filed against me for other crimes 1 may have commixed which
are now known to the prosecuting attornev i am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made
or sought b\ either delensc counsel or counsel for the Stale, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by
the Judge
JO I have read (his Allidavu. or I have had it read to mc by my attorney, and 1 know and understand us contents i
am /LA*
vcars of age. have attended school through the
understand the Knuhsh iamzuuL'e.
Dated this

i±

Z& QllfrLsf

an(j

j c a n r . :ac j

jncj

C.AV Ol

Defendant
laant^^^-^
Subscribed and sworn to betore me in Court this.

.day o

r

.

7>^'

19

•M—r^^-

il

Judge
< K R U F I C A T E OF D E F E N S E ATTORNEY:
I certify that I am the attorney for
the defendant named above anu I know i,v«
'.,o iead the Aifidavit, or that I have read it to him. and I discu^afcd it with him and believe he fully understands tht
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements.
representations and declarations made by the
Affidavit are in ail respecu accurate and :ruc.

se Attornev
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:

it*
I certifv that I am the attorney for the State of Utah m its case against PJMJ
/v &\M**) L^it^iLtuu
, dctendant.
I have reviewed the .Affidavit oi the defendant and find that the declarations arc true and accura/e. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to
believe the evidence vvould support the conviction of the defendant for the pica offered, and that acceptance of ;he plea
would serve the public interest.

La

Prosecuting Attorney
ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth m the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea ol
guilts is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set lorth in the
Aifidavit be accepted and entered.
.
r*

J
Done in Court this

^TZ'^-'

JL

day of

/

p^

*
. 19 .

r

District Judue
i
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APPENDIX "B"

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

3

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

4
5
6

vs.

)

Criminal No. CR83-1541

ROBERT EDWARD BRADBURY, aka
ANTHONY S. EARL,

7

Defendant.
8
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
9

THE STATE OF UTAH,
10

Plaintiff,
11

Criminal No. CR83-1542

vs.
12
13
14
15
16

ROBERT EDWARD BRADBURY, aka
ANTHONY S. EARL,
Defendant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled cause

17

came on regularly on the daily motion calendar for a change

18

of plea before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, a Judge of

19

the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, at

20

Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 1st

21

day of February, 1984, at 9:00 a.m., and that the following

22

proceedings were had.

23
24
25

ALAN P SMITH CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES 266-0320
COURTS BLDG 240 E 4 S (801) 535 7372
231 JUDGE BUILDING OFF 533-0800
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111

2

APPEARANCES
For the

Plaintiff:

Carvel R. Harward, Esq.
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111

For the Defendant:

*

:

David C. B i g g s , Esq.
S a l t Lake Legal Defenders
Association
333 South 2nd East
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
*

*

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

State of Utah versus Robert

Edward Bradbury
MR. BIGGS: Yes, your Honor.
MR. HARWARD:

Carvel Harward for the

State.
MR. BIGGS:

David B i g g s , your Honor.

Mr. Bradbury's true and c o r r e c t name i s Anthony
Samuel E a r l .

I b e l i e v e that was placed in both f i l e s .
THE COURT: Wait a minute.

one f i l e , Andy.

We have t o get the other

I only have

file.

I guess we b e t t e r take a five-minute r e c e s s and
get the f i l e .
(Short r e c e s s . )
THE COURT: You may proceed, counsel.

AI.AN l> r ,MITH, CSR
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3
MR. HARWARD:
MR. BIGGS:

Thank you, your Honor.

David Biggs for Mr. Earl.

We are here today to enter a plea in both files,
your Honor, in the following:
In File No. 83-1541 there will be a plea as charge
in count two, aggravated exploitation of prostitution, second
degree felony. The other two counts in that particular information will be dismissed.
In the other file, your Honor, 83-1542, there will]
be a plea to a lesser included offense of attempted aggravated
kidnapping in count one, and count two will be dismissed.. We
have, we being myself and Mr. Earl have, prepared an affidavit,
have gone over that affidavit. Mr. Earl understands his
constitutional rights, understands the maximum possible penalties of the two charges and is prepared at this particular time
to sign the affidavit in open court.
THE COURT: Mr. Harward.
MR. HARWARD:
Honor.

That is the arrangement, your

If the Court accepts that, and the lesser included of-

fense that defendant is pleading to in 1942 is also a second
degree felony, so he is pleading to two second degree felonies.
MR. BIGGS: That is correct, your Honor.
MR. HARWARD:

And I have been the prose-

cutor on the case since the time it was filed and in my opinion
this is a just disposition considering all of the circumstances!.

ALAN P SMITH, CSR
365 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES 266-0320
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4
The victims are aware of what we are doing and havp
been made aware of the intended plea bargain and it is acceptable to the victims.
THE COURT: And they feel comfortable
with it?
MR. HARWARD:

Yes.

I should mention as

to Brenda Price, the main victim in 1941, there are medical
bills in the approximate amount of $300 and we will be asking
for that as restitution. There are three different defendants
and I donft know how that will be allocated, but as part of
the sentencing of the three defendants we will want restitution
of the out-of-pocket expenses of Brenda Price. And Mr. Earle
acknowledges that, your Honor, and is prepared to pay his
share.
THE COURT: Again, Mr. Harward, you feel
that this is done in the interest of justice and the victim
is aware of it, what is taking place?
MR. HARWARD: Yes.
THE COURT: And you are recommending
this to the Court?
MR. HARWARD: Yes.
THE COURT:

Sir, you have heard the repre-

sentations made by your attorney and agreed to by the State
indicated that it is your desire to plead guilty in Case No.
83-1541 to count two, aggravated exploitation of prostitution,

ALAN P SMITH CSR
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1

a second degree felony, and upon your doing so count one,

2

aggravated sexual assault, a first degree felony, and count

3

three, aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, would

4

I be dismissed.

5
6

7

J

MR. EARLE:

That is right.

THE COURT:

Also in Case No. 83-1542 you

would be pleading guilty to an amended count one of attempted

8

I aggravated kidnapping, a second degree felony, and the State

9

J would move to amend count one from aggravated kidnapping,

10

a first degree felony, and move to dismiss count two, aggra-

11

I vated sexual assault, a first degree felony.

12

I intent, sir?

Is that your

13

MR. EARLE:

Yes, your Honor, it is.

14

THE COURT:

Have you gone over an affi-

15

davit with your attorney?

16

MR. EARLE:

Yes, your Honor, I have.

17

THE COURT:

And do you understand the

18

contents of that document?

19

MR. EARLE:

20

THE COURT: Do you understand if you sign

2i

j that you will be pleading guilty as I have stated to you?
MR. EARLE:

23

24

Yes, your Honor, I do.

Yes, your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: You will be waiving your
| right to a trial, your right to confront the witnesses, your
right to appeal to a higher court.

ALAN P SMITH, CSR
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MR. EARLE: Yes , your Honor, I do.
THE COURT: You also understand that if
you were to go to trial in this matter you would not be
compelled to take the witness5 stand and testify?

MR. EARLE: Yes , your Honor, I do.
THE COURT: Are you presently under the
influence) of any type of alcohol <3r narcotics or medication
that would impair your ability to exercise your free consent?

MR. EARLE: No, your Honor, I am not.
THE COURT: Are you doing this of your
own free will and consent?

MR. EARLE: Yes,, your Honor, I am.
THE COURT: And not being forcecI in any
way?
MR. EARLE: No, your Honor.
THE COURT:

And understanding that the

restitution for all matters will be, you will be subject to
be liable for that restitution.
MR. EARLE:

Yes, your Honor.

I will pay.

THE COURT:

How do you plead, sir?

MR. EARLE:

Guilty, your Honor.

THE COURT: You may proceed and execute
your affidavit.

Upon doing so the court will grant the State1

motion to dismiss count one and count three in 83-1541 and
amended count one, and dismiss count two in 1542.

ALAN P SMITH, CSR
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7
The record may show the defendant has signed his
affidavit in open court, it also has been signed by his
attorney and the attorney for the State, and the court executes the same, being in open court in the presence of the
defendant*
What is your desire, counsel, regarding sentencing
MR. BIGGS:

Your Honor, we would ask for

the preparation of a presentence report in this matter.
THE COURT:

And you would waive your

MR. BIGGS:

Yes, your Honor*

THE COURT:

The Court would ask the clerk

THE CLERK:

Well, let's see, set it for

statutory time?

to set a date.

February 21 at 9:00.
MR. HARWARD:

Your Honor, could we make

it a matter of record that there have been no promises to the
defendant as to what the sentence will be and it is my understanding defense attorney has advised him what the possible
maximum penalty could be for each count; there have been no
promises.
MR. BIGGS:

That is correct.

That is

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. BIGGS:

Thank you, your Honor.

correct.

ALAN P SMITH, CSR
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8
MR, EARLE:

Thank you, your Honor.
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
State of Utah

)
)
)

County of Salt Lake

ss.

I, Alan P. Smith, do hereby certify:
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License
No. 38, and one of the Official Court Reporters of the State
of Utah; that on the 1st day of February, 1984, I attended
the within matter and recorded in shorthand the proceedings
had thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand notes to
be transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 8, inclusive, constitute a full, true and
correct account of the same to the best of my ability.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this,

_day

of
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ALAN P SMITH

'X /%w^

an P, Smith, Court Reporter
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